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REFERENCE:

To: All Senior Security Managers and/or Security Focal Points  
All Designated Officials  
All Field Security Coordination Officers

Fax No.: See Attached List

From: Diana Russler  
Director and Deputy United Nations Security Coordinator

Fax No.: 212-963-4104

Date: 21 July 2004

Subject: Minimum Operating Security Standards

Please find attached the Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS) policy document, which was discussed and endorsed at the annual meeting of the Inter-Agency Security Management Network (IASMN) held in Rome from 10-14 May 2004.

As some of you might be aware, the Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS) and the subsequent enhancements to MOSS, which came about as a result of the specific threat from terrorism, were the subject of a validation exercise undertaken by Control Risks Group (CRG), an outside security risk management company. This external evaluation was conducted at the request of the Deputy Secretary-General to determine whether the measures outlined were appropriate to the security needs of the United Nations.

Some of the CRG recommendations regarding the MOSS document, including the enhancements, were incorporated into a revised MOSS, which was presented to the IASMN along with the main findings of the evaluation. At this time, the IASMN positively noted that the CRG had validated the MOSS and the revised MOSS was subsequently endorsed.

Please be guided accordingly.

Kind regards.

1 July 2004

## **MINIMUM OPERATING SECURITY STANDARDS (MOSS)** **POLICY DOCUMENT**

### **GENERAL**

#### **Introduction**

MOSS is a fundamental policy document for all United Nations field operations. It was developed in response to the threats and risks faced by United Nations staff and operations to ensure that minimal essential security practices and procedures are established and equipment and physical resources are available to mitigate the risk. MOSS is a system-wide initiative that is managed by UNSECOORD.

Each country team and operation is required to develop a country MOSS using the MOSS policy document as a starting point. These instructions introduce the MOSS policy document and provide detailed guidance for the development and implementation of a country MOSS.

#### **MOSS Policy Document**

The MOSS policy document should be regarded as a baseline. It has been developed by UNSECOORD in coordination with Designated Officials and the Inter Agency Security Management Network (IASMN). It is a generic document that sets the minimum operating security standards for United Nations field operations globally.

#### **Purpose**

The purpose of MOSS is to establish a standard field based criteria for minimum security arrangements to enhance staff security, mitigate risk and support and enable field operations.

#### **Accountability**

Within the report of the Secretary-General, dated 28 August 2002, 'Inter-organizational Security Measures: Framework for Accountability for the United Nations Field Security Management System', MOSS is a defined responsibility for senior managers in the field and at agency headquarters. As such it is subject to accountability.

## **Format**

The baseline MOSS document is presented in a tabular format. It commences with the requirements for countries in which no security phase has been declared, i.e. 'No Phase'. This is followed by the requirements of the five separate security Phases of the United Nations Management System.

The tables are cumulative, with those requirements starting at 'No Phase' being implicit to all other Phases; e.g. the requirements of MOSS under Phase Three include all the requirements of 'No Phase', Phases One and Two.

When changing from one Phase up to a higher Phase (e.g. Phase One to Phase Two) the increased measures for the new phase are required to be implemented as soon as possible. Typically full implementation is to be completed within a maximum of 60 days from declaration of the Phase change.

## **Scope**

MOSS provides the minimum standards to manage those 'normal' risks typically encountered at field duty stations. As such the MOSS table indicates, "what you must have" and not, "what you would like to have" in order to mitigate risk and safely conduct operations within the country. It is noted; however, that in some duty stations where there is open war or civil conflict additional protective resources may be necessary. Annex A to MOSS is designed to address these situations. Further, the threat of terrorist attacks requires enhanced resources. The risk of terrorism is global and may, just as likely be apparent in a no phase country as a phase three country. Annex B to MOSS is designed to address these situations.

Annex A to the MOSS table 'Protective Equipment and Facilities' provides a list of additional resources, procedures and equipment to mitigate risk when dealing with threats relating to operating in armed conflict situations and/or areas where mines are apparent.

Annex B to the MOSS table 'Enhanced Protective Measures and Resources for the Threat of Terrorism' provides a list of additional resources, procedures and equipment necessary to mitigate risk when operating in areas where the threat of terrorism is apparent.

The use of any or all of the resources/equipment in Annex A or B must be justified by a security risk assessment and applied adopting the relevant United Nations guidelines.

## **Financial Implications**

MOSS implementation has certain financial and resource implications at the country level, funding for which remains the responsibility of the Country Team; UNSECOORD does not have funds for MOSS implementation. Any financial implications will have two aspects:

1. The inter-agency, or common system, requirement for joint funding.
2. The single-agency requirement for Agency equipment.

Example: A country MOSS may require a 24-hour/7-days per week communications centre, plus VHF handsets for all international staff and selected national staff, plus shatter resistant film for all UN offices. Common system costs will include the communications centre, its operators, and its equipment. Whereas single-agency costs of the same MOSS will include VHF radios for that Agency's staff and for the required blast protective film for that Agency's offices only.

### **Malicious Acts Insurance Policy**

The underwriters of the Malicious Acts Insurance Policy (MAIP) have noted the United Nation's compliance to MOSS. Therefore, non-compliance of MOSS measures may be used by the policy underwriters as justification for denying or reducing compensation in the event of an incident involving United Nations staff.

### **Development of the Country MOSS**

The development of each country MOSS is to be preceded by a detailed and thorough Security Risk Assessment conducted by a 'competent authority' in coordination with the Security Management Team (SMT). For the purposes of conducting a formal Security Risk Assessment, 'competent authorities' are considered to be; UNSECOORD Security Coordination Officers, Field Security Coordination Officers (FSCO), Security Officers (SO) from United Nations Agencies, DPKO Chief Security Officers (CSO) or any other person specifically approved by UNSECOORD for that purpose.

The Designated Official and the Security Management Team are responsible to develop their country MOSS. Only one MOSS is usually produced for each country. The five steps required in the development of a country-specific MOSS are as follows:

**Step 1:** Conduct a Security Risk Assessment and confirm the Security Phases.

**Step 2:** Compare the extant security measures in each security Phase against those required in the MOSS policy document (baseline) and determine shortfalls, if any.

**Step 3:** Identify, if any, what additional measures are required to mitigate the specific risks in the country that are above the requirements set out in the MOSS policy document.

**Step 4:** Once all MOSS requirements have been considered and documented, the MOSS should be presented in the tabular format. The SMT will then endorse the country MOSS and forward it to UNSECOORD for review.

**Step 5:** UNSECOORD will authorise the country MOSS. The MOSS is then implemented at the country level, with equipment obtained and installed, training undertaken and structures put in place.

## **Implementation of MOSS**

All countries are required to have a country MOSS and to have implemented it completely. When Phases are changed the implementation of changes to the country MOSS should be conducted as rapidly as possible (at least within 60 days) - hence the need for pre-planning is paramount. A country with no security Phase **MUST** have a contingency for the implementation and procurement of assets and resources necessary to move to Phase One. The MOSS system is designed to ensure, as far as possible, a logical and smooth transition from a lower to higher phase with minimal increase in actual resources. The largest resource requirement is from No Phase to Phase One.

The following explanations provide clarity to some of the concepts and terminology used in the MOSS policy document.

### **1. Telecommunications**

ECS. The concept of an Emergency Communications System (ECS) ensures there is a reliable communications structure/link established between those United Nations staff that have been appointed with security and safety responsibilities (i.e. DO, FSCO, SMT members, Wardens, ASCs and selected staff). The ECS is a structural and procedural element of MOSS that is reinforced by radios at Phase One. It has two elements; (1) the ability for the security officials, and others, to communicate within the country, and (2) the ability for senior security officials to communicate to UNSECOORD and other organisations outside the country. Radios are required in the establishment of a Phase One (or greater) ECS because they provide an independent means of communications that is not afforded by cellular telephones and perhaps hand-held, satellite telephones.

No Phase. Under conditions of 'No Phase' the ECS is based on 'appropriate and available means' to ensure reliable security/safety communications between the SMT members, Wardens and ASCs. This may be a combination of cellular telephones, landlines telephones, email or radios as appropriate. Mobile satellite telephones are required to enable the FSCO and DO to maintain communications with UNSECOORD and other organisations.

Phase One. In Phase One the ECS is reinforced with a fully operational and independent radio network of UHF, VHF and/or HF radios. The ECS in Phase One is to be 'monitored' on a 24-hour basis - this ensures that emergency calls can be effectively serviced. A simple system of identifying a 'duty officer' may be appropriate for monitoring purposes. In this way security linkage is maintained between all security officials at the duty station. Lastly, there is a requirement to equip and establish a common-system Communications Centre/Radio Room, and a Crises Coordination Centre (CCC) in the Capital, and at each of those outlying locations outside the Capital. There is

no requirement to have these facilities operating on a 24-hours a day basis, but they are to be equipped with all the necessary resources to ensure that, should it be necessary, they can be operated effectively. Note: Radio room and CCC are not to be used as storage or other disruptive uses.

Phase Two. Phase Two is typically considered as an interim Security Phase during which the SMT considers whether the security environment is likely to deteriorate further (perhaps to Phase Three) or to improve (return to Phase One). As per the Field Security Handbook, 'essential staff' are to be identified, and provided with VHF/UHF radios. The dedicated Radio Rooms are to be operated to maintain 24/7 communications operations. This will likely include email, fax and satellite telephone operations.

## 2. Vehicles

No Phase. All UN vehicles may be utilised throughout all areas of the country not under any Security Phase. All UN drivers must have appropriate driving documentation (National driving licenses and/or relevant UN certification). UN vehicles must be able to be identified as UN vehicles at all times, and must be correctly registered and insured in the country.

Phase One. Under Phase One the DO is responsible to be aware of the location of all UN staff at all times and an effective and reliable system to monitor staff whereabouts is required. Further, all vehicles are to have an 'effective and reliable' means of communications – this may be achieved by a proven reliable, cellular telephone system with wide area coverage. This allows the implementation of the necessary system of movement control (or tracking) of UN vehicles so that the DO can fulfil his responsibilities. In addition, 'Field Vehicles' need to be identified and equipped, these will be full-size, 4x4 vehicles equipped with radio communications for field mission outside of the Capital area/region.

Phase Two. All vehicles operating in a Phase Two environment are to be equipped with UHF, VHF and/or HF radios.

Phase Three. All drivers are to be provided with VHF/UHF, handheld radios. Specialised equipment may be identified and procured for these 'Field Vehicles' as appropriate (e.g. extra spare tyres, spare fuel, emergency lights, ballistic blankets, etc).

## 3. Training

All Phases. All UN staff are required to complete the basic Security Awareness' CD-ROM. In addition, throughout the process of MOSS development and implementation, security managers must be aware of the need to provide training and briefings for the general staff and for those with security responsibilities. The FSCO is required to undertake such training and UNSECOORD can provide additional resources as appropriate.

Phase Three. Specialised training must be provided to selected staff on, trauma kits, protective equipment or facilities, etc, as appropriate.

#### 4. Equipment

No Phase. 'Emergency power supply' is a common-system, independent and reliable source of electrical generation to ensure communications equipment is operative, security lighting is available at all times, essential business functions can be conducted even after the loss of 'city supplied' or commercially supplied power. In certain locations, electricity or other power supplies may be critical for basic warmth (e.g. Mongolia). Emergency fuel is required for these facilities in all instances. Contingency plans for the procurement of Phase One equipment are to be established.

Phase Two. Contingency plans are required for the procurement and installation of appropriate Specialised Equipment (see paragraph 6 below).

Phase Three. Specialised protective equipment is to be procured and fitted as appropriate and as described in Annex A.

#### 5. Security Plan

No Phase. A functional Security Plan, based on a formal Security Risk Assessment, is required for all UN duty stations as described in the Field Security Handbook (FSH) to include an operational Warden system and the appointment of ASCs as appropriate. In addition each Country Team must establish local security Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for various emergency scenarios. All buildings are to have an Emergency Evacuation Plan in place. Staff should be fully briefed on the contents of these documents and have access to all relevant UN policy and operational security documents.

Phase One. Security clearance procedures (in accordance with the FSH) are to be established and implemented. This includes country-specific travel clearance procedures. SMTs are required to meet at least monthly.

#### 6. Specialised Equipment

FSCO Equipment. The FSCO is provided with certain standard equipment by UNSECOORD. Additionally, the FSCO security budget provides for specialised field kit as required.

Trauma Kit. A trauma kit is required in Phase Two. It is an advanced first aid kit with specialised medical equipment to treat major trauma injuries. Normally this requires the attendance of a qualified paramedic, nurse or doctor. At least one UN staff member should be trained in the use of this equipment.

PEP Kit. Post Exposure Prevention (PEP) kits are provided and managed by WHO. At the field level the PEPs are typically held under the care of the WHO representative.

They are designed for use under the supervision of a medical doctor but can be initiated without such

#### 7. Protective Equipment and Facilities (See Annex A).

For those countries exposed to threats from active conflict or war, including explosive attack, artillery/mortar fire, aerial bombardment, heavy-machine gunfire, ambush attack or landmines and UXOs, protective equipment and facilities may be appropriate in the development of a country MOSS.

Construction, procurement and/or deployment of any of the below protective equipment/facilities is to be recommended by a 'competent authority' after the completion of a Security Risk Assessment (endorsed by the SMT), and endorsed by UNSECOORD.

Training is required for all protective equipment and facilities. For example, for body armour it must include: fitting and donning, protection levels, care and maintenance, vehicle carriage and authority to wear/discard.

NBC – Security Directive # 5 provides policy on NBC issues. (Not a MOSS requirement.)

#### 8. Enhanced Protective Measures and Resources for Threat of Terrorism (See Annex B).

Determining threat and risk is a complex task. On one hand, a terrorist threat could be present and necessitate counter-measures in a country that is otherwise at security Phase One or lower. On the other hand, terrorist animosity and intent towards the United Nations is likely to vary throughout the world, as will the capacity of host governments to provide protection. There may be some countries at a very high security phase that may not, at least in the short term, face a major terrorist threat.

For this reason, the enhanced protective measures and resources are designed as a "supplement" to the MOSS policy document. In the first instant implementation is to be considered based on the global level of the specific terrorist threat ("green" for negligible or low risk, "amber" for medium risk, and "red" for high risk) for each location. Countries at the 'green' risk level may not require additional resources above baseline MOSS. However, those countries with risk levels at 'amber' or 'red' will need to review current protective and procedural requirements from the Annex B table to enhance their current security regime.

The extent of the enhancement application will be determined by the SMT, based on the local Security Risk Assessment, endorsed by UNSECOORD. In this manner, counter-terrorism measures can be selectively "bolted onto" the existing baseline MOSS for a country, location, or region taking into account the particular local requirements and operational environment.

## **Conclusion**

The MOSS policy document is an enabling mechanism that provides a system-wide process that establishes a foundation of minimum levels of security resources, procedures and practices to ensure a minimum level of risk mitigation and security preparedness at the field level. The implementation of MOSS combined with effective security and risk management will create conditions for a working environment that is, as far as is reasonably possible, safe and secure for UN staff and operations.

## **TERMINOLOGY**

In general, the terminology used in the Field Security Handbook is used throughout MOSS. However, the following words and phrases are also noted within the MOSS 'baseline' document:

**Country Offices.** Although various Agencies may use variant terms, the 'Country Offices' used in MOSS describes those country headquarters offices typically located in the Capital city of that country, e.g. Those UNDP, UNFPA and IMF offices in Colombo, Sri Lanka.

**Offices Outside the Capital.** Those offices considered to be sub-offices, or affiliated offices, to those Country Offices (above). They are typically located well outside the Capital city, and come under the responsibility of an ASC for security matters.

**Common-system.** Used to indicate at least one such facility, equipment or capability is to be provided for the UN system in that country or specific Area within the country.

**Area.** As per the Field Security Handbook in relation to security planning. In general, the term 'Area' defines a geographic area within which an Area Security Coordinator (ASC) is appointed by the DO. The ASC, in addition to his/her normal Agency duties, has specific security related responsibilities within his/her Area similar to the DO.

**Monitored.** In relation to the ECS in No Phase declared situations, the term 'monitored' implies that all staff within the ECS are to be capable of calling an identified individual or callsign/number through a reliable and un-interrupted means of communication, and be able to pass on relevant security information and to receive an appropriate response. The mechanism for this 'monitoring' is determined by the DO/SMT.

**Security Risk Assessment.** This is to be conducted as described in the UN Security Risk Management policy document.

**Independent radio network.** The term 'independent radio network' (Phase One Telecommunications) indicates that the UN communications system, particularly radio networks, are to be owned and operated by the UN whenever possible. This implies that shared arrangements (e.g. co-use of the same VHF Repeater with an NGO, government body or commercial organisation, etc) should be avoided whenever possible.

**Security Channel.** A separate frequency, perhaps through a separate VHF/UHF Repeater, that is dedicated as a security channel with limited access to the relevant security management personnel as directed by the DO.

**Field Vehicles.** Those vehicles appropriate for heavy duty in a crisis or high-risk environment. Typically high quality, full-size, 4x4, four door utility sedan type vehicles, fitted with appropriate communications and specialised equipment as appropriate.

**Specialised Equipment.** That protective equipment or facility utilised in high-risk environments where the threat of aerial bombardment, roadside attack or random anti-personnel landmines is considered to be significant. For the implementation of MOSS this includes; Body Armour, Ballistic Blankets for vehicles, Bunkers and Blast Protective Film for windows.

**Mobile Satellite Telephone.** As opposed to a static, embedded satellite telephone that would not be capable of rapid deployment to a Concentration Point, DO's residence, or ECC, etc in time of crises.

**Radio Room.** More accurately defined as a communications centre, the 'radio room' is to be equipped and fitted with those means of communications appropriate for the country security plan and may include, email, satellite telephone, facsimile, VHF/UHF radio base stations, HF base stations, landline telephone, Telex or other system. An identified alternate site should also be identified so that a rapid change can be instigated if necessary.

**Crises Coordination Centre (CCC).** An identified room equipped and fitted with appropriate equipment to allow for the convening of crisis management groups and to enable them to access appropriate documents, facilities and resources in a comfortable group working environment. This may be a designated conference room but should not be an operating office or storage area. It should be near to, or share some facilities of, the Radio Room. Consideration should be given to the site of the CCC so that access in times of crisis is possible. An identified alternate site should also be identified so that a rapid change can be instigated if necessary.

## NO PHASE

### Telecommunications

<u>Country Offices</u> (Agency HQ's in Capitals)	<b>Offices Outside Capital</b>	<b>Individual Staff</b>	<b>Procedures</b>	<b>Requirement</b>
<p>Establish an <b>Emergency Communications System (ECS)</b><sup>1</sup> throughout the functional area of the Capital, and its operational locations, utilizing 'appropriate and available means' in order to:<sup>2</sup></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Provide communications between DO, FSCO, SMT, Wardens.</li> <li>2. Provide communications between the DO, FSCO and ASCs.</li> </ol>	<p>Establish an <b>Emergency Communications System (ECS)</b> throughout the operational 'Area' utilizing 'appropriate and available means' in order to.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Provide communications between the ASC and the AFSCO, SMT within the Area.</li> <li>2. Provide communications between ASC and DO/FSCO in the Capital.</li> </ol>	<p>DO, FSCO, SMT members, ASCs and selected staff provided with appropriate and available means of communications in order to establish and operate an ECS.</p>	<p>ECS is to be tested and practiced on a monthly basis. All new users require ECS training.</p>	<p>ECS network to be capable of operating 24 hour/7 days per week (24/7) with uninterrupted and reliable communications between the DO, FSO, SMT and all Wardens and ASCs.</p>
<p>Establish an <b>ECS</b> to enable communications between the DO/SMT/FSCO and relevant UN Offices outside the country (including UNSECOORD).</p> <p>Provide a common-system, mobile satellite telephone.</p>			<p>A contingency plan for resource mobilisation of communications equipment requirements in readiness for Phase One, is to be developed.</p>	

<sup>1</sup> ECS has two primary functions: (1) To ensure members of the security management structure are able to communicate with each other during a crisis or emergency (2) To enable the DO/SMT to communicate security/emergency information to UNSECOORD and other offices outside the country.

<sup>2</sup> With regard to an ECS in No Phase, the term "appropriate and available means" would typically mean cellular/mobile telephones, together with satellite telephones, but in countries where an administrative or natural disruption of the relevant communications networks is likely then a VHF/HF network is required. The WGET points out that the use of cellular phones should not be considered as a reliable alternative to a radio network in emergency situations even in No Phase situations.

# NO PHASE

## Security Plan

Country Offices	Offices Outside Capital	Vehicles	Staff
<b><u>Documentation with DO, SMT and FSCO:</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Security Risk Assessment.<sup>3</sup></li> <li>• UN Field Security Handbook (FSH).</li> <li>• Security Operations Manual.</li> <li>• Country-specific Security Plan.</li> <li>• Country-specific MOSS.</li> <li>• Security Standard Operating Procedures.</li> <li>• Medical evacuation procedures.</li> <li>• Relevant country maps.</li> </ul>	1. Area Security Coordinators (ASC) appointed.  2. <b><u>Documentation with ASC:</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UN Field Security Handbook.</li> <li>• Security Operations Manual.</li> <li>• Area-specific Security Plan.</li> <li>• Area-specific MOSS.</li> <li>• Security Standard Operating Procedures.</li> <li>• Medical evacuation procedures.</li> <li>• Relevant country maps.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Drivers must have a relevant and current, national driving licence.</li> <li>• All UN vehicles appropriately registered by the Host Government.</li> <li>• All vehicles appropriately marked with UN logos/flags/decals, etc (as per country SOPs).</li> </ul>	<u>All staff provided with:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UN Security in the Field booklet.</li> </ul> <u>All staff required to:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Make themselves aware of relevant Country/Area-specific Security Plan, SOPs and policies.</li> <li>• Comply with all UN security policies.</li> </ul>
<b><u>Warden Systems</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Established and operational.</li> <li>• Exercised regularly.</li> </ul>	<b><u>Warden Systems</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Established and operational.</li> <li>• Exercised regularly.</li> </ul>		<u>All new staff provided with:</u> Country-specific security orientation briefing.
<b><u>Building Emergency/Evacuation Plan</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Established for all UN offices and facilities.</li> <li>• Exercised every six months.</li> </ul>	<b><u>Building Emergency/Evacuation Plan</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Established for all UN offices and facilities.</li> <li>• Exercised every six months.</li> </ul>		<b><u>Training</u></b> All staff to complete Basic Security Awareness CD-ROM.

<sup>3</sup> To be conducted by a 'competent authority' and may include recommendations for 'protective equipment and facilities.

## NO PHASE

### Equipment

Country Offices	Offices Outside Capital	Vehicles	Staff
<p><b>Emergency power supply</b> available for charging and operation of appropriate, <b>common-system</b> communications equipment, office external security lighting and essential computer facilities<sup>4</sup>.</p> <p><b>PEP kits</b> obtained for the <b>common-system</b> (provided and managed by WHO).</p> <p><b>Contingency plans</b> for the procurement of Phase One MOSS equipment requirements is to be established.</p>	<p><b>Emergency power supply</b> available for charging and operation of appropriate, <b>common-system</b>, communications equipment, office external security lighting and essential computer facilities.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• First aid kit.</li> <li>• Fire extinguisher</li> <li>• Spare wheel, jack and appropriate tools.</li> <li>• Vehicles appropriately marked (as above).</li> <li>• Seat belts.</li> </ul>	<p>FSCO provided with standard equipment.<sup>5</sup></p>

<sup>4</sup> This is to ensure the integrity of the ECS in times of crisis. A common-system facility is required, as part of MOSS, to maintain the capabilities noted (typically the UN House). However, it is recommended that all Agencies with separate compounds adopt a similar requirement.

<sup>5</sup> When an FSCO is appointed to a country, UNSECOORD, or the FSCO's budget, will provide the following mandatory equipment or the funds to purchase them: radio equipment, telephone (satellite and cellular), laptop computer and accessories, digital camera, GPS, first aid kit.

## PHASE ONE

### Telecommunications

Country Offices	Offices Outside Capital	Vehicles	Individual Staff	Procedures
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>ECS</b> is to be reinforced with fully operational, independent radio network utilizing UHF, VHF and/or HF equipment.</li> <li>• <b>Security channel</b> for DO, FSCO and SMT members incorporated into radio networks.</li> <li>• <b>A system</b> is to be established to ensure all ECS communications are monitored 24/7<sup>6</sup></li> <li>• <b>A common-system</b> radio room is to be established and equipped.<sup>7</sup></li> <li>• <b>A common-system Crisis Coordination Centre (CCC) to be established.</b><sup>8</sup></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>ECS</b> is to be reinforced with fully operational, independent radio network utilizing UHF, VHF and/or HF equipment.</li> <li>• <b>Security channel</b> for ASC, AFSCO, local SMT and Wardens incorporated into radio networks.</li> <li>• <b>A system</b> is to be established to ensure all ECS communications are monitored 24/7.</li> <li>• <b>A common-system</b> radio room is to be established and equipped.</li> <li>• <b>A common-system</b> Crisis Coordination Centre (CCC) to be established.</li> </ul>	<p>Provision of effective and reliable communications to all UN vehicles.<sup>9</sup></p> <p>'Field Vehicles' identified and equipped.<sup>10</sup></p>	<p>DO, FSCO, ASCs, SMT members, Wardens and selected staff provided with UHF/VHF handset radios. At a minimum all staff with radios are required to participate in a monthly radio check.</p>	<p>Same as 'No Phase'.</p> <p>Scheduled radio checks conducted to include regular vehicle tracking.</p>
Mobile satellite telephone available to each UN Agency Country Office.	Mobile Satellite telephone available to each ASC and AFSCO (if appointed).			

<sup>6</sup> In Phase One "monitored" may be allocated to a duty officer or other nominated staff member to ensure their radio is on, and capable of being responded to.

<sup>7</sup> Radio room to be equipped with base station radios, satellite telephone, email, etc.

<sup>8</sup> CCC is to be located in/or close to the radio room and is used during crises (maybe conference room but with additional, appropriate equipment).

<sup>9</sup> May utilise cellular telephones under a wide area coverage, or within city limits. For travel outside of the network vehicles will require VHF/UHF/HF radios.

<sup>10</sup> 'Field Vehicles' are vehicles equipped with radio communications for field missions outside of the capital area/region. (4x4 type vehicles).

## PHASE ONE

### Security Plan & Equipment

<b>Country Offices</b>	<b>Offices Outside Capital</b>	<b>Vehicles</b>	<b>Staff</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Same requirements as 'No Phase'.</li> <li>• Security clearance request system established.</li> <li>• SMT meetings at least once a month.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Same requirements as 'No Phase'.</li> <li>• Security clearance request system established.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Same requirements as 'No Phase'.</li> <li>• 'Field Vehicles' identified and equipped (see footnote 9).</li> <li>• Vehicle 'movement control' procedures implemented.</li> <li>• Contingency plan for resource mobilisation of equipment requirements in readiness for Phase Two and above to be developed.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Same requirements as 'No Phase'.</li> <li>• All staff to be provided briefing on UN security arrangements and Security Plan.</li> </ul>
<u>Documentation</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Same as 'No Phase'.</li> <li>• Country-specific travel clearance procedures in effect, in accordance with Field Security Handbook (FSH).</li> </ul>	<u>Documentation</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Same as 'No Phase'.</li> <li>• Area and Country-specific travel clearance procedures in effect, in accordance with FSH.</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• All staff to prepare individual 'emergency bags.'<sup>11</sup></li> <li>• FSCO provided with additional equipment appropriate to conditions.</li> </ul>

<sup>11</sup> 'Emergency Bag' is a 15 kilogram (maximum) bag designed to be ready for rapid relocation or evacuation. Contains identification and essential items only.

## PHASE TWO

### Telecommunications

<b>Country Offices</b>	<u>Offices Outside Capital</u>	<b>Vehicles, Staff and Procedures</b>	<b>General Requirement</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Same as 'No Phase' and Phase I requirements.</li> <li>Operate <b>common-system</b>, 24/7 security radio room.</li> <li>Mobile satellite telephone provided to DO, Agency Heads, FSCO and other key individuals.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Same as 'No Phase' and Phase I requirements.</li> <li>Operate <b>common-system</b>, 24/7 security radio room.</li> <li>Mobile satellite telephone available for ASC.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>All Phase Three 'essential staff' identified, and provided with VHF/UHF radios.</li> </ul> <p>Weekly Radio checks for all staff are recommended.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Same as 'No Phase' and Phase I requirements.</li> <li>Initiate resource contingency plan as appropriate for move to Phase 3.</li> <li>A <b>common-system</b> radio technician employed.</li> </ul>

### Security Plan

<b>Country Offices</b>	<u>Offices Outside Capital</u>	<u>Vehicles, Staff and Procedures</u>	<b>General Requirement</b>
Same as 'No Phase' and Phase I requirements.	Same as 'No Phase' and Phase I requirements.	Same as 'No Phase' and Phase I requirements.	Same as 'No Phase' and Phase I requirements.

### Equipment

<b>Country Offices</b>	<b>Offices Outside Capital</b>	<b>Vehicles</b>	<b>Staff</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Same as 'No Phase' and Phase I requirements.</li> <li>Plan developed for the procurement and deployment of Phase 3 MOSS telecommunications and equipment requirements.</li> </ul>	Same as 'No Phase' and Phase I requirements.	Same as 'No Phase' and Phase I requirements.	Same as 'No Phase' and Phase I requirements.

## PHASE THREE

### Telecommunications

Country Offices	Offices Outside Capital	Vehicles	Staff	Procedures/Requirement
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Same requirements for 'No Phase', Phase I and II.</li> <li>• Operate Crisis Coordination Centre as required.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Same requirements for 'No Phase', Phase I &amp; II.</li> <li>• Operate Crisis Coordination Centre as required.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• All vehicles to be equipped with VHF and/or HF radios.</li> <li>• Satellite telephones provided for 'field vehicles' as appropriate.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Same requirements for 'No Phase', Phase I and II.</li> <li>• All international and selected national staff provided with VHF/UHF handheld radios.</li> <li>• All drivers provided with VHF/UHF handheld radios.</li> </ul>	<p>Same requirements for 'No Phase', Phase I and II.</p> <p>Regular radio checks with all staff, vehicles and offices – Daily checks are highly recommended.</p> <p>Vehicle tracking – Missions to report position on regular basis – Hourly checks are recommended.</p>

### **Security Plan**

Country Offices	Offices Outside Capital	Vehicles	Staff
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Same requirements for 'No Phase', Phase I and II.</li> <li>• SMT to meet every week.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Same requirements for 'No Phase', Phase I and II.</li> <li>• ASC to form local SMT and meet weekly.</li> </ul>	<p>Same requirements for 'No Phase', Phase I and II.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Same requirements for 'No Phase', Phase I and II.</li> <li>• Ongoing country-specific, countrywide, staff security training scheduled.</li> <li>• Specialised training identified and initiated (e.g. body armour usage; mine awareness, etc).</li> </ul>

## PHASE THREE

### Equipment

Country Office	Offices Outside Capital	Vehicles	Staff
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Same requirements for 'No Phase', Phase I and II.</li> <li>• GPS located at each Country Office.</li> <li>• <b>Emergency power supply</b> to all UN Agency offices.</li> <li>• Emergency fuel and spare parts for <b>emergency power supply</b> obtained.</li> <li>• Emergency food stocks for Concentration Points obtained and managed.<sup>12</sup></li> <li>• Medical Trauma kit obtained.<sup>13</sup></li> <li>• Protective equipment and facilities provided as appropriate (see Annex A).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Same requirements for 'No Phase', Phase I and II.</li> <li>• GPS located with ASC.</li> <li>• <b>Emergency power supply</b> to all UN Agency offices.</li> <li>• Emergency fuel and spare parts for <b>emergency power supply</b> obtained.</li> <li>• Protective equipment and facilities provided as appropriate (see Annex A).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Same requirements for 'No Phase', Phase I and II.</li> <li>• 'Field Vehicles' to be utilised for all missions.</li> <li>• Protective equipment to be obtained and fitted as appropriate.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Same requirements for 'No Phase', Phase I and II.</li> <li>• Training provided to relevant staff on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• GPS system.</li> <li>• Medical trauma kit.</li> <li>• Protective equipment and facilities provided as appropriate (see Annex A).</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

<sup>12</sup> As per requirements of the Field Security Handbook (FSH).

<sup>13</sup> Minimum of one per common-system.

#### **PHASE FOUR**

No change from Phase Three

#### **PHASE FIVE**

Special security clearance procedures and resource requirements as directed by  
UNSECOORD

## **PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT AND FACILITIES - ANNEX A**

<b>BODY ARMOUR</b>				
<b>Country Offices</b>	<b>Sub Offices</b>	<b>Vehicles</b>	<b>Staff</b>	<b>Procedures</b>
SOPs relating to body armour. Management plan for secure storage, maintenance and care for all body armour	SOPs relating to body armour. Management plan for secure storage, maintenance and care for all body armour	Body Armour carried inside the vehicle as per SOP's	Training provided to all staff expected to utilise equipment, especially drivers.	Security Risk Assessment document written by 'competent authority'
<b>Shatter Resistant Film</b>				
<b>Country Offices</b>	<b>Sub Offices</b>	<b>Vehicles</b>	<b>Staff</b>	<b>Procedures</b>
Fitted as per UN Guideline and in accordance with suppliers standards.	Fitted as per UN Guideline and in accordance with suppliers standards.	May be used on 'mission vehicles'.	Training provided to all staff expected to utilise equipment	Security Risk Assessment document written by 'competent authority'
<b>BALLISTIC BLANKETS</b>				
<b>Country offices</b>	<b>Sub Offices</b>	<b>Vehicles</b>	<b>Staff</b>	<b>Procedures</b>
SOPs relating to ballistic blankets. Management plan for maintenance and care for all ballistic blankets	SOPs relating to ballistic blankets. Management plan for maintenance and care for all ballistic blankets	Those 'field vehicles' expected to operate in the affected areas may be fitted with ballistic blankets.	Training provided to all staff expected to utilise equipment	Security Risk Assessment document written by 'competent authority'
<b>BUNKERS AND REINFORCED ROOMS</b>				
<b>Country Offices</b>	<b>Sub Offices</b>	<b>Vehicles</b>	<b>Staff</b>	<b>Procedures</b>
SOPs relating to bunkers. Management plan for construction, maintenance and care for all bunkers and reinforced rooms.	SOPs relating to bunkers. Management plan for construction, maintenance and care for all bunkers and reinforced rooms.	May be a requirement to construct reinforced garages or 'blast walls' to protect vehicles.	Training provided to all staff expected to utilise the bunker or reinforced room.	Security Risk Assessment document written by 'competent authority'

## ENHANCED PROTECTIVE MEASURES AND RESOURCES FOR THREAT OF TERRORISM – ANNEX B

### TELECOMMUNICATIONS

Country Offices	Sub Offices	Vehicles	Staff	Procedures
<p>1. ECS must be established in line with MOSS. In addition depending on the risk of local terrorism the MOSS can be upgraded to require 24/7 radio room and all or partial Phase 3 MOSS ECS requirements regardless of the country phase in effect.</p> <p>2. In addition there may be a requirement to increase the confidentiality of information. MOSS upgrades can include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Electronic Encryption (fax/phone)</li> <li>• Electronic encryption of security radio frequencies</li> <li>• IT firewalls</li> <li>• Current anti virus</li> </ul>	<p>ECS must be established in line with MOSS. In addition depending on the risk of local terrorism the MOSS can be upgraded to require 24/7 radio room and all or partial Phase 3 MOSS ECS requirements regardless of the country phase in effect.</p> <p>2. In addition there may be a requirement to increase the confidentiality of information. MOSS upgrades can include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Electronic Encryption (fax/phone)</li> <li>• Electronic encryption of security radio frequencies</li> <li>• IT firewalls</li> <li>• Current anti virus</li> </ul>	<p>In addition to baseline MOSS regardless of the security phase vehicles telecommunications requirements can be upgraded to Phase 3 MOSS level.</p>	<p>In addition to baseline MOSS, regardless of the security phase, staff telecommunications requirements can be upgraded to Phase 3 MOSS level.</p>	<p>1. 'Validated' Country specific Security Risk Assessment prepared by 'competent authority'.</p> <p>2. SOPs developed to include additional requirements for:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Movcon</li> <li>• Radio Checks</li> <li>• ECS continuity checks</li> </ul>

## **EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING**

<b>Country Offices</b>	<b>Sub Offices</b>	<b>Vehicles</b>	<b>Staff</b>	<b>Procedures</b>
<p>Access Control requirements to detect: Stabbing/Firearm weapons, chemicals and/or bomb components:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Xray machine at visitors entrance.</li> <li>2. Metal detector archways and/or wands at visitors entrance.</li> <li>3. Xray machine at common post registry.</li> <li>4. Vehicle check mirror at entrance.</li> </ol> <p>The above equipment would require:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. SOPs relating to the above items.</li> <li>2. Maintenance and care regime.</li> </ol>	<p>Access Control requirements to detect: Stabbing/Firearm weapons, chemicals and/or bomb components:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Xray machine at visitors entrance.</li> <li>2. Metal detector archways and/or wands at visitors entrance.</li> <li>3. Xray machine at common post registry.</li> <li>4. Vehicle check mirror at entrance.</li> </ol> <p>The above equipment would require:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. SOPs relating to the above items.</li> <li>2. Maintenance and care regime</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Each vehicle to have a 'Vehicle check Mirror' for detecting bomb components.</li> <li>2. Specific enhanced security Movcon SOPs</li> </ol> <p>Based on the particular security risk assessment and in coordination with UNSECOORD the use of armoured/protected vehicles can be considered.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Training in the use of equipment.</li> <li>2. Selected personnel trained in 'Enhanced Security' techniques as appropriate to the risk.</li> <li>3. Selected personnel trained in specific 'Risk Management Techniques'.</li> <li>4. Specific training for Guards in 'Enhanced Security techniques' and use of equipment.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. 'Validated' Country specific Security Risk Assessment prepared by 'competent authority'.</li> <li>2. Relevant SOPs developed for additional use and control of equipment.</li> </ol>

## **SECURITY PLAN**

<b>Country Offices and Sub Offices</b>	<b>Vehicles</b>	<b>Staff</b>	<b>Procedures</b>
<p>Required documentation, plans and SOPs:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Action plans relevant to terrorist threats, for example what to do if. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Car bomb/IED.</li> <li>• Letter bomb.</li> <li>• Chemical through the mail.</li> <li>• Person found with concealed weapon/bomb.</li> <li>• Suicide bomber</li> </ul> </li> <li>2. Enhanced security access control SOPs to allow for active inspection/screening of personnel.</li> </ol> <p>Information analysis cell to be created to develop credible information for the SMT and UNSECOORD</p>	<p>Required documentation, plans and SOPs:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Action plans/SOPs relevant to terrorist threat, for example what to do if: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Find a bomb planted on vehicle when parked.</li> <li>• Kidnap/Hijack attempt.</li> <li>• Ambush.</li> </ul> </li> </ol>	<p>All staff should be given relevant basic training to familiarise themselves with additional MOSS equipment and procedures.</p>	<p>'Validated' Country specific Security Risk Assessment prepared by 'competent authority'.</p>

## **RECOMMENDED PERIMETER PROTECTION STANDARDS AND ACCESS CONTROL PROCEDURES**

### **Country Offices and Sub Offices**

Perimeter integrity is a function of the threat which in the case of Terrorism requires, in some cases, extreme counter measures. The use of any or all of the resources/equipment below will enhance perimeter integrity and mitigate the particular risk. Implementation must be preceded by a security risk assessment and applied adopting the relevant United Nations guidelines:

1. Shatter Resistant Film (SRF) fitted to all windows as per UN guideline.
2. Wall constructed as per UN guidelines
3. Minimum stand-off between wall and building to be determined as part of the Country Specific MOSS using the UN guidelines.
4. Minimum clear zone extending inward from protected side of wall to be determined as part of the Country Specific MOSS using UN guidelines.
5. CCTV monitoring and recording of perimeter with 24/7 control room as per UN guidelines.
6. Additional temporary barriers for example, barbed/razor wire, sandbags, jersey barriers and other filled barriers are to be available within one day of being required.
7. Anti-Ram barriers/gates at vehicle entrance as per UN guidelines.
8. Perimeter and building flood lighting to be installed as per UN guidelines.
9. In event of a power failure all security related and critical lighting must resume full operation within 90 seconds all remaining lighting systems must resume full operation within 5 minutes.
10. Employees parking area to be designated as per UN guidelines.
11. The motor pool to be designated as per UN guidelines.
12. Visitors parking must be outside the compound.